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Abstract
In this short note we study a class of multi-player, turn-based games with deterministic state transitions
and reachability / safety objectives (this class contains as special cases “classic” two-player reachability
and safety games as well as multi-player and ““stay–in-a-set” and “reach-a-set” games). Quantitative and
qualitative versions of the objectives are presented and for both cases we prove the existence of a deterministic
and memoryless Nash equilibrium; the proof is short and simple, using only Fink’s classic result about the
existence of Nash equilibria for multi-player discounted stochastic games.
1 Introduction
The simplest ω-regular games are, arguably, two-player turn-based safety and reachability games [7]. Multiplayer
variants of these are the “Stay–in-a-set” (SIAS) games [6, 8] and “Reach-a-set” (RAS) games [1, 2]. The existence
of Nash equilibria (NE) has been proved: for SIAS games in [8] and for RAS games in [1, 2]; in particular in the
special case of turn-based games with deterministic state transitions and Borel objectives (these include SIAS
and RAS objectives) the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved in [2, Corollary 1]. In both cases
the state space is assumed finite and the NE are not, in general, memoryless. 1 A stronger result is proved in [9],
namely: every turn-based multi-player game with deterministic state transitions and Borel objectives possesses
a pure sub-game perfect (and hence memoryless) equilibrium. These results are quite general but their proofs
are rather involved.
In the current note our main goal is to provide a short and simple proof of a special case: every turn-based
SIAS and RAS game with deterministic state transitions possesses a deterministic and memoryless NE. This is
proved using only Fink’s classic result on the existence of NE for multi-player discounted stochastic games [5].
Our result is actually a little more general, in that it applies to the class of multi-player, turn-based games
with deterministic state transitions, reachability objectives for some players and safety objectives for others. For
brevity, we will henceforth refer to these as multi-player reachability / safety games (MPRS games); they contain
as special cases classic reachability and safety games as well as SIAS and RAS games.
Informally, the MPRS game can best be visualized as a graphical game, in which N players move a token
along the arcs of a digraph G = (V,E). The vertices of G are partitioned into N sets: V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ ... ∪ VN ; if
at the t-th turn the token is located on a vertex vt ∈ Vn, then it is moved by the n-th player (henceforth denoted
by Pn) into some vertex vt+1 such that (vt, vt+1) is an arc of G. In general we have two type of players: reachers
and avoiders. To each Pn is associated a nonempty set Rn ⊆ V , related to his objective. If Pn is a reacher,
he wins iff the token enters some vertex v ∈ Rn; if he is an avoider, he wins iff the token never enters a vertex
v ∈ Rn.
In Section 2 we define the quantitative MPRS game and prove that every such game has a NE in deterministic
memoryless strategies. In Section 3 we do the same things for the qualitative MPRS game.
1In [2, Theorem 1] is also proved the existence of memoryless ε-NE for a broader class, which contains SIAS and RAS games.
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2 The Quantitative MPRS Game
We now formulate MPRS as a discounted stochastic game.2 In what follows the quantities N , V , E, V1, ..., VN ,
R1, ..., RN are the ones presented in the previous section.
1. The player set is {P1, P2, ..., PN} or, for simplicity, {1, 2, ..., N}.
2. The state set is S := V ∪ {s}, where V is the vertex set of the previously mentioned G = (V,E) and s is
the terminal state.
3. We define {S1, ..., SN}, a partition of S, as follows: S1 := V1 ∪ {s}, S2 := V2, ..., SN := VN .
4. For n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, Pn’s target set is Rn; the total target set is R := ∪Nm=1Rm.
5. An (s) denotes Pn’s action set when the game is at state s and is defined by (λ is the “trivial” move):
when s ∈ Sn\R : An (s) := {s
′ : (s, s′) ∈ E} ;
when s ∈ Sm\R,m 6= n : An (s) := {λ} ;
when s ∈ R ∪ {s} : An (s) := {λ} .
Pn’s “total” action set is An := ∪s∈SAn (s).
6. The law of motion is deterministic and has the following form
when s ∈ Sn\R and a = (λ, ..., a
n, ..., λ) : Pr (st+1 = s
′|st = s, at = a) :=
{
1 when s′ = an,
0 else;
(2.1)
when s ∈ R ∪ {s} and a = (λ, ..., λ, ..., λ) : Pr (st+1 = s
′|st = s, at = a) :=
{
1 when s′ = s,
0 else.
(2.2)
All admissible state/action combinations are covered by (2.1)-(2.2), from which we see the following.
(a) If the current state s “belongs” to Pn (i.e., s ∈ Sn) and is not a target state, then he is the only player
who can perform a non-trivial action an ∈ V ; the next state is, with certainty, an.
(b) If the current state s is either target or terminal, then the only admissible action vector is a =
(λ, ..., λ, ..., λ); the next and all subsequent states are the terminal s.
It is convenient to describe the deterministic state transitions in terms of a state transition function
T : S ×A→ S, defined by
T (s, an) :=
{
an when s ∈ Sn\R and a
n ∈ An (s) \λ,
s when s ∈ R ∪ {s} and an = λ.
(2.3)
All admissible state/action combinations are covered by (2.3).
7. Pn’s turn payoff function depends only on the current game state s (but not on the current action vector)
and can be either of the following:
qn (s) :=
{
1 when s ∈ Rn
0 when s /∈ Rn
(Pn is a reacher); q
n (s) :=
{
−1 when s ∈ Rn
0 when s /∈ Rn
(Pn is an avoider).
Pn’s total payoff function is (with the discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1)): Qn (s0, s1, ...) =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tqn (st).
The game starts at an initial state s0 = s ∈ S\s and, at the t-th turn (t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}) all players perform
“trivial” moves, except for the player who “owns” st. Two possibilities exist.
2We follow the formulation of [4], expanded to the multi-player case.
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1. If a target state is entered at some time t′ (st′ = s
′ ∈ R = ∪Nm=1Rm) the next and all subsequent states
are the terminal (∀t > t′ : st = s).3 For each n ∈ {1, ..., N}, Pn receives total payoff:
Qn (s0, s1, ...) =

γt
′
if s′ ∈ Rn and he is a reacher;
−γt
′
if s′ ∈ Rn and he is an avoider;
0 if s′ /∈ Rn.
2. If a target state is never entered (∀t : st /∈ R), the game continues ad infinitum and all players receive zero
payoff.
A reacher (resp. avoider) Pn wants the game to enter Rn in the shortest (resp. longest) possible time. Hence
the above defined discounted stochastic game will be called “quantitative MPRS game”.
A finite-length history is a finite sequence of states (we omit player actions, since they will not be needed in
our proof4):
h = s0s1...sk ∈ S × S × ...× S︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
for some k ∈ {1, 2, ...} ;
the set of all finite-length histories is denoted by H∗. A deterministic strategy for the n-th player is a function
σn which assigns an action to each finite-length history: σn : H∗ → An. A strategy σn is called memoryless
if it only depends on the current state, in which case we write (with a slight notation abuse) σn (s0s1...sk) =
σn (sk). A strategy profile is a tuple σ =
(
σ1, σ2, ..., σN
)
which specifies one strategy for each player. As usual,
σ−n =
(
σj
)
j∈{1,2,...,N}\{n}
, so we can write σ = (σn, σ−n). Since an initial state s0 and a deterministic strategy
profile σ determine fully the history s0s1s2..., the payoff function Q
n (s0, s1, ...) will also be written as Q
n (s0, σ),
Qn
(
s0, σ
1, ..., σN
)
or Qn (s0, σ
n, σ−n).
Theorem 2.1 Every quantitative MPRS game has a deterministic memoryless NE. In other words, there exists
a profile of deterministic memoryless strategies σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, ..., σ̂N
)
such that
∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} , ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀σ
n : Qn
(
s0, σ̂
n, σ̂−n
)
≥ Qn
(
s0, σ
n, σ̂−n
)
. (2.4)
For every s and n, let un (s) := Qn (s, σ̂). Then the following equations are satisfied
∀n, ∀s ∈ Sn : σ̂
n (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] , (2.5)
∀n,m, ∀s ∈ Sn : u
m (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σ̂n (s))) . (2.6)
Proof. Fink has proved in [5] that every N -player discounted stochastic game has a memoryless NE in proba-
bilistic strategies; this result holds for the general game (i.e., with concurrent moves and probabilistic strategies
and state transitions). According to [5], at equilibrium the following equations must be satisfied for all m and s:
u
m (s) = max
pm(s)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
...
∑
aN∈AN (s)
p1
(
a1|s
)
...pN
(
aN |s
) [
qm (s) + γ
∑
s′
Π
(
s′|s, a1, ..., aN
)
u
m (s′)
]
, (2.7)
where we have modified Fink’s original notation to fit our own; in particular:
1. um (s) is the expected value of um (s);
2. pm (am|s) is the probability that, given the current game state is s, the m-th player plays action am;
3. pm (s) = (pm (am|s))am∈Am(s) is the vector of all such probabilities (one probability per available action);
4. Π
(
s′|s, a1, a2, ..., aN
)
is the probability that, given the current state is s and the player actions are
a1, a2, ..., aN , the next state is s′ .
3Hence, while the game lasts an infinite number of turns, it effectively ends at t′.
4Besides they are directly inferred from the states, due to the deterministic law of motion.
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Now choose any n and any s ∈ Sn. For all m 6= n, the m-th player has a single move: Am (s) = {λ}, and so
pm (am|s) = 1. Also, since transitions are deterministic,∑
s′
Π
(
s′|s, a1, a2, ..., aN
)
u
n (s′) = un (T (s, an)) .
Hence, for m = n, (2.7) becomes
u
n (s) = max
pn(s)
∑
an∈An(s)
pn (an|s) [qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] . (2.8)
Furthermore let us define σ̂n (s) (for the specific s and n) by
σ̂n (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] . (2.9)
If (2.8) is satisfied by more than one an, we set σ̂n (s) to one of these arbitrarily. Then, to maximize the sum
in (2.8) the n-th player must set pn (σ̂n (s) |s) = 1 and pn (an|s) = 0 for all an 6= σ̂n (s). Since this is true
for all states and all players (i.e., every player can, without loss, use deterministic strategies) we also have
u
n (s) = un (s). Hence (2.8) becomes
un (s) = max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] = qn (s) + γun (T (s, σ̂n (s))) . (2.10)
For m 6= n, the m-th player has no choice of action and (2.8) becomes
um (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σ̂n (s))) . (2.11)
We recognize that (2.9)-(2.11) are (2.5)-(2.6); replacing un (T (s, an)) with un (T (s, an)) in (2.9) defines σ̂n (s)
for every n and s and so yields the required deterministic memoryless strategies σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, ..., σ̂3
)
.
3 The Qualitative MPRS Game
The qualitative MPRS game elements are identical to those of the quantitative one, except for the payoff
functions. The qualitative game: (i) does not have a turn payoff function; (ii) has total payoff function
Q˜n (s0, σ) =

1 if Qn (s0, σ) > 0,
−1 if Qn (s0, σ) < 0,
0 if Qn (s0, σ) = 0;
It is easily checked that: Q˜n (s0, σ) = 1 (resp. Q˜
n (s0, σ) = 0) iff Pn is a reacher (resp. an avoider) and his
target set is entered (resp. not entered). Accordingly, in the qualitative MPRS game Pn wins (resp. loses) iff
he achieves the maximum (resp. minimum) possible value of Q˜n. More specifically, we have the following.
1. When Pn is a reacher, he wins (resp. loses) iff Q˜
n (s0, σ) = 1 (resp. Q˜
n (s0, σ) = 0).
2. When Pn is an avoider, he wins (resp. loses) iff Q˜
n (s0, σ) = 0 (resp. Q˜
n (s0, σ) = −1).
In short, the quantitative Qn’s defines the qualitative Q˜n’s which are used to formalize win/lose criteria
analogous to these of reachability, safety, RAS and SIAS games; these are special cases of qualitative MPRS:
1. two-player reachability games (N = 2, P1 a reacher with R1 6= ∅ and P2 an avoider with R2 = R1);
2. safety games (same as the reachability game, with player roles interhanged);
3. SIAS games (∀n : Pn is an avoider);
4. RAS games (∀n : Pn is a reacher). 5
5Note that, while the RAS game can be seen as a variant of the classic reachability game, it is not a generalization thereof,
because it does not involve a player with safety objectives [1, 2]. Similarly, the classic safety game is not a SIAS game.
4
The most general MPRS game involves N1 reachers and N2 avoiders; we can have more than one winners (e.g.,
if Pm and Pn are reachers, both win if the token enters some v ∈ Rm ∩Rn 6= ∅) and the same is true for losers.
It is easily checked that every σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, ..., σ̂N
)
which is a NE of the Qn’s is also a NE of the Q˜n’s. Hence, by
Theorem 2.1, we have the following.
Corollary 3.1 Every qualitative MPRS game has a deterministic memoryless NE.
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